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Abstract 
 
 
The generally weak correlation between board independence and firm performance is a major 
empirical puzzle. One possible explanation is that director independence alone is not enough. To 
explore this possibility, we examine the full employment histories of independent directors at 
S&P 1500 companies. We define an independent expert director (IED) as an independent director 
who has worked in the same 2-digit SIC industry as the company where he/she serves as an 
independent director. We show that the proportion of IEDs on a board is positively and 
significantly correlated with firm performance. We find that when the proportion of IEDs is 
higher, there are fewer earnings restatements and larger cash holdings. Firms with IEDs have 
higher CEO pay-performance sensitivity, higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, and more 
patents with more citations. Stock market investors react positively to IED appointments. We also 
find the higher the CEO power, the less likely IEDs will be on board. 
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“Over a span of 40 years, I have been on 19 public company boards and have interacted with perhaps 
250 directors. Most of them were ‘independent’ as defined by today’s rules. But their contribution to 
shareholder well-being was minimal at best. These people simply did not know enough about the 
business.” 
                                    ---Warren Buffet (Chair, Berkshire Hathaway) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The first decade of the 21st century has witnessed a series of legislative and regulatory efforts 
to increase the proportion of independent directors on corporate boards. For example, in response to 
major corporate scandals and to strengthen the corporate governance practices of publicly listed firms 
in America, the US Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX: Public Company Accounting 
Reform and Investor Protection Act) in 2002, which requires that the audit committees of all publicly 
listed firms in the US consist solely of independent directors. In 2003, both New York Stock 
Exchange and NASDAQ announced that it would require all companies listed at NYSE to have a 
majority of independent directors after 2005. NYSE further required that the nominating, corporate 
governance, and compensation committees of companies listed at NYSE to consist entirely of 
independent directors after 2005.  
These legislative actions were based on the “conventional wisdom” that a mandatory increase 
in board independence would lead to better corporate governance, which in turn would provide better 
protection of shareholders’ interests and lead to better corporate decisions and firm performance. 
Unfortunately, so far, this “conventional wisdom” has not yet found solid empirical evidence to 
support it. For example, the proportion of independent directors on a board is not robustly correlated 
with either corporate policies (e.g., Guthrie et al., forthcoming) or firm performance (Bhagat and 
Black, 2001). Sometimes, the signs of the correlations found in samples are even opposite to what the 
“conventional wisdom” would predict (e.g., Guthrie et al., forthcoming; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). 
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Based on this evidence, should we infer that board independence does not matter for corporate 
decisions and firm performance? 
We argue that the failure to find robust empirical evidence to support the “conventional 
wisdom” is due to the fact that previous studies rely on the proportion of independent directors as the 
measure of board independence. The major problem with this measure is that by treating all 
independent directors as a homogeneous group, it masks the heterogeneity among them. We argue that 
researchers have largely overlooked one particularly important dimension of independent directors’ 
heterogeneous qualities: their industry experience.  
The intuition behind our argument may be best summarized by a quote from Bob Tricker, the 
founding editor of Corporate Governance: An International Review: 
“Herein lies a dilemma. The more independent directors are, the less they are likely to know about the 
company, its business and its industry. Conversely, the more directors know about the company’s 
business, organization, strategies, markets, competitors, and technologies, the less independent they 
become. Yet such people are exactly what top management needs to contribute to its strategy, policy 
making and enterprise risk assessment.”1 
Facing this apparent tradeoff between directors’ independence and their industry-specific 
knowledge, it is not surprising that independence alone would not suffice to make a director a better 
one. As a result, it is not surprising that the proportion of independent directors is not robustly 
correlated with either corporate decisions or firm performance. In fact, anecdotal evidence shows that 
investors pay attention to not only the independence of directors, but also their industry experience. 
The market reactions to the replacement of independent directors of Bank of America in 2009 provide 
a case in point. On June 6, 2009, the Wall Street Journal reported that “[f]our outside directors with 
                                                            
1 See http://corporategovernanceoup.wordpress.com/2010/12/06/is-director-independence-so-important/. 
4 
 
experience in banking or financial oversight joined Bank of America Corp.’s board Friday, a move 
aimed at satisfying strong suggestions from federal regulators that the Charlotte, N.C., lender improve 
its corporate governance.” The Wall Street Journal mentioned that these four new outside directors 
with experience in the banking industry replaced two incumbent outside directors without experience 
in the banking industry. Table 1 reports the dramatic market reaction to this news. 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
When the 2008 financial crisis broke out, corporate boards at rescued institutions took partly 
the blame of the collapse. Clearly, SOX was not enough: the banks in trouble were largely in 
compliance with SOX and had an 80% of independent directors sitting on their boards (Pozen, 2010). 
Adams (2011), in her research on corporate governance and the financial crisis, also finds that the 
“most surprising result” was that TARP banks (i.e., bailed-out banks) had boards that were more 
independent than non-TARP banks. While board independence is indisputably important to ensure 
right incentives for board directors to perform their roles, especially their monitoring role, directors’ 
abilities and information are at least as important as their incentives for them to effectively perform 
their monitoring and advisory roles. Board directors develop their industry-specific abilities and 
information through industry experience.  
Based on our above analysis and anecdotal evidence, we propose our fundamental hypothesis: 
independent expert directors (IEDs), i.e., independent directors with industry experience, have 
positive and significant effects on firm performance, but independent non-expert directors (INEDs), 
i.e., the independent directors with no industry experience, do not have significant effects on firm 
performance. We further investigate how IEDs affect firm performance by influencing major 
corporate decisions, such as earnings restatement, cash holdings, CEO pay-performance sensitivity, 
and innovative activities. We hypothesize that “one size does not fit all”, i.e., the effects of IEDs on 
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firm performance and corporate decisions depend on the nature of the specific firms, such as their 
complexity and their other external and internal corporate governance mechanisms. We also 
hypothesize that investors react more positively to the appointments of IEDs versus the appointments 
of INEDs. Lastly, we hypothesize that powerful CEOs would entrench themselves by deterring 
appointments of IEDs. Therefore, CEO power is expected to be negatively correlated with the 
presence of IEDs on the board.  
To test the above hypotheses, we collect information on the full employment histories of board 
directors of S&P 1,500 companies between 2000 and 2008 from the BoardEx database of 
Management Diagnostics Ltd., a professional human resources management company. This database 
has been used by Fracassi and Tate (2012) in their analysis of external network connections between 
directors and CEOs. In contrast with other databases that only record the current employment 
affiliations of board directors (such as RiskMetrics and Board Analyst), BoardEx carefully records the 
full employment history of board directors, thus allowing us to accurately classify independent 
directors into IEDs and INEDs. We define an IED as an independent director who has worked in the 
same 2-digit SIC industry as the company where he/she serves as an independent director. BoardEx 
also meticulously records the announcement dates of new director appointments, thus allowing us to 
conduct event studies to contrast the market reactions to IED appointment announcements with the 
market reactions to INED appointment announcements. 
           To estimate the effects of IEDs and INEDs on firm performance, we use Heckman’s (1979) 
two-step procedure to produce consistent estimates that account for self-selection (similar to Masulis 
and Mobbs, 2011). For the first step estimation, inspired by Knyazeva et al. (2011), we use the 
number of firms in the same industry in the neighborhood (defined as the first 3 digits of the ZIP code) 
as an exogenous determinant of IEDs. To alleviate the concern regarding the direct competition 
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between firms in the same industry, we only count firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry but not in 
the same 4-digit SIC industry as the exogenous determinant of IEDs.  
Our first step estimation in the Heckman two-step procedure shows that in more complex firms, 
as measured by their R&D intensity, IEDs are more likely to be present. This result is intuitive 
because more complex firms have greater need for industry-specific knowledge for decision making. 
Our second step estimation in the Heckman two-step procedure shows that the proportion of IEDs, but 
not INEDs, is positively and significantly correlated with industry-adjusted logarithm market-to-book 
ratio. This confirms our hypothesis that IEDs significantly enhance firm performance, while INEDs 
do not have significant effects on firm performance. We also find that for firms that report positive 
R&D expenditures, IEDs significantly enhance firm performance, but for firms that report zero R&D 
expenditures, IEDs do not have significant effects on firm performance. Further, we find that for firms 
with higher information costs, defined as those with more analyst forecast dispersion, or fewer 
analysts following them, IEDs significantly boost firm performance, while for firms with lower 
information costs, IEDs do not have significant effects on firm performance. 
Our investigation into the effects of IEDs on key corporate decisions show that the proportion 
of IEDs, but not the proportion of INEDs, on the board, is negatively and significantly correlated with 
the probability of earnings restatements, especially for firms with less entrenched CEOs, i.e., firms 
with an E-index below the median. This suggests that as the CEOs become more entrenched, IEDs 
may be less likely to challenge the CEOs. As the result, the effectiveness of IEDs’ monitoring role 
diminishes as the CEOs become more entrenched.  
Further, we show that the proportion of IEDs, but not the proportion of INEDs, on the board, is 
positively and significantly correlated with firm’s cash holdings, especially for firms with positive 
R&D expenditures. We show that the presence of IEDs on a board significantly enhances the CEO 
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pay-performance sensitivity. It also significantly boosts the innovative activities of the firm, as 
measured by the number of patents and citations. 
Finally, we show that the more CEO power, the less likely that IEDs would be present on a 
board. This confirms our hypothesis that powerful CEOs tend to deter appointments of IEDs on the 
board so that they may capture the board more easily. 
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to systematically examine the effects of 
independent directors’ industry experience on key corporate decisions and firm performance.  It is 
puzzling why there is no robust correlation between board independence, corporate decisions and firm 
performance. We tackle the puzzle from the angle of the industry experience of independent directors. 
Our results show that IEDs are more likely to contribute to higher firm performance by making better 
key corporate decisions. 
Our paper complements the literature on the expertise and experience of board directors. For 
example, Guner et al. (2008) and Kroszner and Strahan (2001) examine the impact of the financial 
expertise of directors on firm decisions. McDonald et al. (2008) examine the effects of outside 
director acquisition experience on firm acquisition performance. Knyazeva et al. (2009) investigate 
the impact of board heterogeneity on firm value and key decisions. On the other hand, Kor and 
Fredrickson (2008) examine the difference in outside directors’ industry-specific experience between 
young and old firms from a demand-side perspective. Dass et al. (2011) examine the roles of 
“directors from related industries” and find evidence that such directors help bridge the information 
gap between supplier firms and customer firms. 
         The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We review the related literature on board 
directors, corporate decisions and firm performance and develop hypotheses in Section 2. Section 3 
reports the data and estimation results. Section 4 concludes.  
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2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development      
Even though independent directors are expected to generate significant improvements in firm 
performance through their monitoring and advisory activities, the existing literature shows mixed 
empirical evidence that puzzles researchers, investors and regulators. For example, Bhagat and Black 
(2001) find “no convincing evidence that greater board independence correlates with greater firm 
profitability or faster growth”, and even “some evidence that firms with supermajority-independent 
boards are less profitable than other firms.” Bhagat and Bolton (2008) examine updated data and 
actually find that board independence is negatively correlated with contemporaneous and subsequent 
operating performance. On the other hand, Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) find that the stock market 
reacts negatively to sudden deaths to independent directors in the US (very short-term changes in firm 
value) and they conclude that this provides some evidence that the independent directors provide a 
valuable service to shareholders. 
The current literature offers explanations of the mixed results from different angles. These 
angles include: (1) Endogeneity: Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, 2003), Harris and Raviv (2008), and 
Adams et al. (2010) argue that the lack of a robust relationship between board independence and firm 
performance is due to the endogeneity of board composition; (2) The strategic information transfer 
from the CEO to board directors: Adams and Ferreira (2007) show in theory that board directors need 
sufficient information about the firms to effectively perform their advisory and monitoring roles, but 
the CEOs may choose to disclose different amount of information when they consider directors’ dual 
roles; whereas Faleye et al. (2011) show empirically that as the board becomes more independent, the 
negative advising effects outweigh the benefits of improved monitoring; (3) The definition of 
“independent directors:” Hwang and Kim (2009) and Fracassi and Tate (2012) argue that 
“independent directors” may not be truly independent, and find that quite a few “independent 
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directors” have strong social ties with directors, and that those social ties tend to significantly reduce 
firm value; (4) The heterogeneity of firms: Coles et al. (2008), for example, find that the optimal 
board size varies with the complexity of firms, and the optimal board size tends to be larger for more 
complex firms; and Masulis et al. (2012) find that the impact of foreign independent directors (FDIs) 
on firm performance depends on whether the firm has much business presence in its FID’s home 
region. 
We offer a new explanation for the empirical puzzle of why board independence has no robust 
correlation with firm performance. Specifically, we hypothesize that IEDs, instead of all independent 
directors, have significant and positive effects on firm performance. This is because IEDs have both 
the incentives and industry-specific expertise to effectively perform their advisory and monitoring 
roles. The industry-specific expertise can help IEDs alleviate the information asymmetry between 
independent directors and corporate insiders such as the CEO. Ravina and Sapienza (2010) show that 
firm information asymmetry can be a serious problem. They contrast the profitability of trades in their 
companies’ stocks made by independent directors and corporate insiders, respectively. They find that 
although both groups make profits in their trades, independent directors make significantly less profit 
than corporate insiders, which shows that the information asymmetry between them can be really 
severe.  
We also hypothesize that for more complex firms, such as firms with positive R&D 
expenditures, IEDs are particularly important because their industry-specific knowledge would be 
more useful there; whereas for less complex firms, such as firms with zero R&D expenditures, IEDs 
may not be as important. This is because for more complex firms, the cost of acquiring information is 
higher than for less complex firms, so the marginal contributions made by IEDs are greater than those 
made by INEDs. Duchin et al. (2010) empirically show that the marginal contributions of independent 
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directors to firm performance depend on the cost of acquiring information. They find that the 
effectiveness of outside directors depends on the cost of acquiring information about the firm. 
Specifically, they show that when the cost of acquiring information is low and outside directors are 
added to the board, firm performance improves. However, when the cost of acquiring information is 
high and outside directors are added to the board, firm performance deteriorates. We hypothesize that 
IEDs can make more positive contributions to firm performance when information costs are higher. 
The above analysis leads us to our first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: IEDs, but not INEDs, have significant and positive effects on firm performance. Such 
effects are more important for complex firms. Such effects are more important for firms with higher 
information costs. 
 
To address endogeneity concerns in testing Hypothesis 1, we use the Heckman 2-step 
estimation procedure as well as 2SLS estimation. We also conduct an event study of the market 
reactions to appointments of IEDs versus INEDs and contrast these market reactions. 
We further investigate the channels through which IEDs may have significant and positive 
effects on firm performance. Specifically, we propose the following hypotheses related to how IEDs 
influence corporate decisions: 
 
Hypothesis 2: IEDs, but not INEDs, can effectively deter earnings restatements. Such effects are 
expected to be stronger for firms with less entrenched CEOs. 
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Agrawal and Chadha (2005) show that board independence is unrelated to the probability of 
earnings restatements. We hypothesize that IEDs, instead of all independent directors, can 
significantly lower the probability of earnings restatements, because their industry-specific expertise 
will allow them to be effective monitors. Even if they are not financial experts, their intuition 
developed through industry experience can allow them to detect abnormal accounting numbers and 
prevent earnings misreporting and subsequent restatements more easily than independent directors 
without relevant industry experience. IEDs may be able to perform their monitoring role more easily if 
the CEO is less entrenched, because the board may have more bargaining power with a less 
entrenched CEO, and receive more firm-specific information as the result. 
 
Hypothesis 3: A higher proportion of IEDs on the board will significantly increase cash holdings.  
Such effects are expected to be stronger for “complex” firms.  
 
If managers’ use of cash reserves is poorly monitored, then these holdings are likely to be used 
by managers to pursue unnecessary investments (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), to conduct mergers and 
acquisition and build business empires (Moeller et al, 2005), or simply to increase spending on perks 
(Yermack, 2006). All these would result in lower cash holdings than the optimal amount. Consistent 
with this “agency view”, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that firms with poor corporate 
governance dissipate cash quickly in ways that significantly reduce operating performance. Harford et 
al. (2008) find that firms with weaker governance, as indicated by low insider ownership and weaker 
shareholder rights (a high G-index), are associated with lower cash holdings. On the other hand, firms 
with strong governance would permit a larger buildup of cash to allow rapid investment as profitable 
opportunities unexpectedly arise. We argue that boards that exercise greater oversight and have better 
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knowledge of firm operations can closely monitor both the buildup and use of cash reserves, limiting 
the misuse of funds.  
Harford et al. (2008) find that board independence is not significantly correlated with cash 
holdings. We argue that IEDs are in a better position than INEDs to monitor cash holdings because 
their industry expertise will allow them to prevent value-destroying acquisitions and capital 
expenditures, and keep sufficient cash within the firms so that profitable investment opportunities will 
not be missed. These effects may not be uniform across firms. Coles et al. (2008) argue that 
“complex” firms have more advising and monitoring needs than “simple” firms, and thus may require 
different features of boards (different board sizes in their paper). We hypothesize that the effects of 
IEDs on cash holdings are stronger for “complex” firms than for “simple” firms. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The presence of IEDs increases CEO-pay-performance sensitivity for “complex” firms. 
 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) estimate that CEO pay decreases 17% more in firms that 
were not compliant with the recent NYSE/NASDAQ board independence requirement than in firms 
that were compliant. These results suggest that more independent boards tend to lower CEO 
compensation. However, these results have recently been challenged by Gutherie, et al. (forthcoming), 
who find that the compensation committee independence requirement actually increases CEO total 
pay. Conyon and Peck (1998) show that in the UK, when the proportion of outside directors on the 
board reaches at least 40%, CEO compensation is significantly and positively correlated with the 
firm’s stock return. 
Different from Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and Gutherie et al. (forthcoming), but 
similar to Conyon and Peck (1998), we examine the effect of IEDs on the CEO’s pay performance 
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sensitivity. We choose to focus on CEO pay performance sensitivity instead of the level of CEO 
compensation because, as Hermalin (2005) shows, a rise in board independence may increase the 
intensity of monitoring and decrease the CEO’s job security. As a result, in equilibrium, a CEO may 
receive higher compensation to reflect the higher risk of dismissal. Second, although the level of CEO 
compensation captures the agency costs of CEOs to some degree, higher pay-performance sensitivity 
may be more effective in aligning the incentives of CEOs with shareholder value.  
 
Hypothesis 5: The presence of IEDs increases the probability of CEO turnover following poor firm 
performance.  
 
The effects of independent directors on CEO turnover following poor firm performance seem 
to be mixed. On the one hand, Weisbach (1988) reports that there is a stronger association between 
prior performance and the probability of a resignation for companies with outsider-dominated boards 
than for companies with insider-dominated boards. Laux (2008) develops a theoretical model that 
predicts that the trend toward greater board independence is associated with subsequent trends toward 
higher CEO turnover. Jenter and Lewellen (2010) find that boards aggressively fire CEOs for poor 
performance, and that the turnover-performance sensitivity increases substantially with board quality. 
However, Jenter and Kannan (forthcoming) find that in their sample of 1,627 CEO turnovers between 
1993 and 2001, CEOs are significantly more likely to be dismissed due to bad industry or market 
returns, instead of bad firm-specific (industry-adjusted) return.  
Motivated by the above studies, we hypothesize that the industry experience of IEDs enables 
them to more accurately attribute firm performance to CEO decisions versus the general trend in the 
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industry. As a result, IEDs can make CEO turnovers more highly correlated with firm performance 
that is below the industry median performance. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Distinct from independent directors, IEDs can better evaluate and implement 
innovative projects, leading to increased firm innovation.  
 
Innovative activities such as new product development and R&D investments are 
characterized by high riskiness and long-term time horizons, and their short-term gains often tend to 
be quite limited. These characteristics make innovative projects hard to evaluate. With industry 
experience, IEDs may be in a better position to evaluate and implement those projects. For example, 
INEDs, because of their lack of understanding of the nature of the industry, may tend to reward the 
CEO only on the basis of short-term financial performance of the firm, but such practice may result in 
“skewing the direction of managerial effort away from the optimally, risky strategies that many 
shareholders prefer” (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). IEDs, on the other hand, may have longer time 
horizons, be able to pick the most promising innovative projects, and create proper incentives for the 
CEO to undertake those risky projects.  
 
Hypothesis 7. Powerful CEOs tend to avoid IEDs on the board. 
 
It has long been recognized that CEOs have strong influence on the selection of board 
members. Generally, CEOs attempt to reduce pressure from active monitoring by reducing board 
independence (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). For example, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) show 
that when the CEO serves on the nominating committee or no nominating committee exists, firms 
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appoint fewer independent outside directors and more gray outsiders with conflicts of interest. Stock 
price reactions to independent director appointments are significantly lower when the CEO is involved 
in director selection. Fracassi and Tate (2012) find that firms with more powerful CEOs are more 
likely to appoint directors with social ties to the CEO. We hypothesize that CEO power has a negative 
and significant impact on the presence of IEDs on the board.  
The current literature has well documented the influence of powerful CEOs on board selection 
and decisions. For example, Westphal and Zajac (1995) find that when incumbent CEOs are more 
powerful than their boards of directors, new directors are likely to be demographically similar to the 
firm’s CEO, and greater demographic similarity between the CEO and the board is likely to result in 
more generous CEO compensation contracts. Ryan and Wiggins (2004) find that, as the tenure of a 
CEO grows, the CEO pay-equity performance sensitivity decreases. Morse et al. (2011) find that 
powerful CEOs induce boards to shift the weight on firm performance measures toward the better 
performing measures, thereby rigging CEO incentive pay. In a similar vein, we hypothesize that 
powerful CEOs would avoid IEDs because with their industry-specific knowledge, they may be able 
to monitor CEOs more intensely. For example, as Hypothesis 5 states, they may increase the CEO-pay 
performance sensitivity, and also make it more difficult for the CEO to “rig the incentive pay.”  
 
3. Data and Results 
3.1. Data 
Our sample consists of S&P 1500 firms between 2000 and 2008. Data on board directors’ 
industry experience are from BoardEx database. We carefully go through the employment history 
section of BoardEx database and match-merge with Compustat Global to find out the industry 
information of the firms that appear in the employment history section. Compustat Global covers over 
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56,000 publicly traded companies in 112 countries, representing 98% of the world's market 
capitalization. All financial data are from Compustat, and all stock return data are from CRSP. 
Following the literature, we drop finance and regulated utilities industries. 
Insert Figure 1 and Table 2 here 
Figure 1 illustrates that the average proportion of independent directors has steadily risen 
during our sample period, as firms attempted to comply with the new legal and regulatory requirement 
on board independence. It is interesting to notice that the steady rise in the independence ratio mainly 
came from the increase in the average proportion of IEDs (independent directors with industry 
experience) on a board, while the average proportion of INEDs (independent directors with no 
industry experience) on a board stays roughly constant after 2003. The proportion of IEDs more than 
doubled between 2000 (14%) and 2008 (29%), while the proportion of INEDs only increased by about 
26% between 2000 (38%) and 2008 (48%). Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the full sample 
in our subsequent regression analysis. 
 
3.2. The determinants of IEDs 
Insert Table 3 here 
Table 3 reports the results when we examine the determinants of IEDs. Knyazeva et al. (2011) 
find that firms located near larger pools of prospective directors have a higher proportion of 
independent directors on their boards. Inspired by Knyazeva et al. (2011), we use the number of firms 
in the same industry in the neighborhood (defined as the first 3 digits of the ZIP code) as an 
exogenous determinant of IEDs. To alleviate the concern regarding the direct competition between 
firms in the same industry, we only count firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry but not in the same 4-
digit SIC industry as the exogenous determinant of IEDs. Since firm location is pre-determined and 
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relatively stable (the relocation of firm headquarters is rare), our measure is arguably a valid 
exogenous determinant of IEDs. Model 1 and Model 4 confirm our conjecture that the number of 
neighboring firms in the same industry is positively and significantly correlated with the presence of 
IED (Model 1) and proportion of the IEDs (Model 4) on a board.  
To differentiate between “complex” firms and “simple” firms, we split our sample into a 
subsample consisting of firms with positive R&D expenditure, and a subsample consisting of firms 
with zero R&D expenditure. Models 2, 3, 5 and 6 show that for “complex” firms, the number of 
neighboring firms in the industry is significantly and positively correlated with the presence of IED 
(Model 2) and the proportion of IEDs (Model 5) on a board, but these results no longer hold when we 
examine “simple” firms. Also, we find that for the full sample as well as for “complex” firms, 
R&D/Sales is positively and significantly correlated with both the presence of IED and the proportion 
of IEDs on a board. On the other hand, when CEO and board chairman are the same person (“CEO-
chair duality”), both the likelihood of having at least one IED and the actual proportion of IEDs on the 
board is significantly lower. This is consistent with Hypothesis 7 that more powerful CEOs can more 
easily avoid IEDs so that he/she can capture the board. 
 
3.3. The impact of IEDs on firm performance 
Insert Table 4 here 
When we estimate the impact of IEDs on firm performance, to tackle the endogeneity issue 
caused by sample selection, we employ a Heckman (1979) two-step procedure. The first-stage 
estimation results are reported in Table 3, and the second-stage estimation results are reported in Table 
4A. Table 4A shows that the proportion of IEDs on a board is positively and significantly correlated 
with industry-median-adjusted ln(Market/Book), but the proportion of INEDs is not. These results 
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hold when we examine firms with positive R&D but do not hold when we examine firms with zero 
R&D. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 1 and seem to echo Mr. Pozen’s comment on 
Citigroup’s board in 2008. With only one independent director who had ever worked in the financial 
services industry, the board was unable to prevent Citigroup from making suboptimal corporate 
decisions leading to poor firm performance.  
In our regression equations, most control variables have the expected signs. For example, 
R&D/Sales and Capital Expenditures/Sales both are positively and significantly correlated with firm 
performance. The number of business segments is negatively and significantly correlated with firm 
performance, which is consistent with some evidence of “diversification discount” reported in the 
literature, such as in Stow and Xing (2006). Board size is negatively and significantly correlated with 
firm performance, which is consistent with Yermack (1996). For robustness check, we also use the 
number of neighboring firms in the same industry as the instrumental variable to estimate 2SLS 
regressions. The results are qualitatively similar to our results from Heckman two-step estimations. 
We also run simple OLS regressions, and the results are qualitatively similar.  
To test whether the effects of IEDs on firm performance depends on information costs, we 
merge our data with IBES database. We measure the information costs by the standard deviation of 
analyst forecast and the number of analysts following the company’s stock (both measures are taken 
within 30 days before the earnings announcements). Specifically, based on the standard deviation of 
analyst forecast, we split our sample into two subsamples: a subsample with “more dispersion” of 
analyst forecast if the standard deviations of analyst forecast are above the median standard deviation 
in the sample, and the other subsample with “less dispersion” of analyst forecast. Based on the number 
of analyst forecasts, we split our sample into two subsamples: a subsample with “more analysts” if the 
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number of analysts following the company’s stock is above the median number in the sample, and the 
other subsample with “fewer analysts.”   
Table 4B reports the results of distinguishing firms by transparency. Models 1 and 4 show that 
when firm information costs are higher, IEDs make significant positive contributions to firm 
performance. Models 2 and 5 show that when firm information costs are lower, IEDs do not make 
significant contributions to firm performance. Model 3 shows that, when we measure information 
costs by the standard deviation of analyst forecast, for firms with higher information costs, IEDs make 
positive and significant contributions to firm performance, but INEDs do not make significant 
contributions. These results lend support to our hypothesis that for firms with higher information costs, 
IEDs play more important roles in mitigating information asymmetries between managers and 
shareholders. 
 
3.4. The impact of IEDs on earnings restatements 
Insert Table 5 here 
To examine the effects of IEDs on earnings restatements, we merge our data with GAO 
(Government Accountability Office) financial restatement database, which records 1,390 restatement 
announcements between July 1, 2002 and September 30, 2005. Table 5 shows, for the full sample, that 
the higher the proportion of IEDs on a board, the less likely a firm would restate its earnings (Model 1 
and Model 4). However, the proportion of INEDs on the board is not significantly correlated with the 
probability of earnings restatement (Model 4). To examine how CEO entrenchment influences the 
effects of IEDs on earnings restatements, we split our full sample into two subsamples: firms in the 
first subsample are characterized by values of E-index (Bebchuk et al., 2009) below the median (E-
index<3), while firms in the second subsample are characterized by value of E-index above the 
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median (E-index>=3). For the first subsample, CEOs are less entrenched, and we find that IEDs can 
effectively deter earnings restatements. However, for the second subsample, CEOs are more 
entrenched, and we find IEDs can no longer effectively deter earnings restatements. These results 
suggest that more entrenched CEOs tend to lower the effectiveness of the monitoring function of IEDs, 
which is consistent with Hypothesis 7. 
 
3.5. The impact of IEDs on cash holdings 
Insert Table 6 here 
In Table 6, we report that, for the full sample, the proportion of IEDs on the board is positively 
and significantly correlated with cash holdings, measured by ln(cash holdings/sales+1) (Model 1 and 
Model 4). On the other hand, the proportion of INEDs on the board is not significantly correlated with 
cash holdings (Model 6). To examine the effects of IEDs on cash holdings in “simple” versus 
“complex” firms, we split our sample into firms with positive R&D and firms with zero R&D, and 
find that the results for the full sample still hold for firms with positive R&D, but not for firms with 
zero R&D (Models 2, 3, 5 and 6). These results are consistent with Hypothesis 3 and show that IEDs 
can effectively monitor the cash holdings of firms. 
 
3.6. The impact of IEDs on CEO pay-performance sensitivity    
To test Hypothesis 4, we merge our data with ExecuComp database. Similar to Conyon 
and Peck (1998), we split our sample into two subsamples: firms with at least one IED on the 
boards, and firms without any IED on the boards. We examine the CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity for these two subsamples, respectively. We measure CEO compensation by ln(Total 
Compensation) and industry-median-adjusted ln(Total Compensation). Following Chhaochharia 
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and Grinstein (2009), we measure firm performance by its stock return in year (t-1). We do not 
use industry-adjusted stock return to measure firm performance because as Jenter and Kanaan 
(forthcoming) show, firms do set CEO pay on the basis of absolute stock return instead of relative 
stock return. 
Insert Table 7 here 
Table 7 shows that for firms with at least one IED on the board, CEO pay is significantly 
and positively correlated with its stock return (Model 1) and industry-median-adjusted stock 
return (Model 3), while for firms with no IED on their boards, CEO pay is not significantly 
correlated with its stock return (Model 2) or industry-median-adjusted stock return (Model 4). 
These results support Hypothesis 4. It is interesting to notice that even for firms with at least one 
IED on their boards, CEO-Board Chairman duality has positive and significant effects on CEO 
total pay, suggesting that the influence of CEO power still effectively boosts CEO compensation, 
despite the presence of IEDs on their boards. 
 
3.7. The impact of IEDs on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity 
To test Hypothesis 5, we infer CEO turnovers from the identities of CEOs recorded in 
ExecuComp database. We include all CEO turnovers instead of just “forced” turnovers. This is 
because Jenter and Lewellen (2010) used several algorithms, including the popular classification 
scheme proposed by Parrino (1997), to classify turnovers into “voluntary” and “forced” turnovers, and 
found that supposedly “voluntary” turnovers are substantially more likely to occur after bad 
performance. Based on this result, they conclude that “many of these turnovers would not have 
occurred had performance been better, and the misclassification of these performance-induced 
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turnovers as voluntary creates a large downward bias in the estimated turnover-performance 
sensitivities.” 
In view of Jenter and Lewellen’s (2010) critique of “forced” turnovers, and following Bebchuk 
et al. (2011), we examine all CEO turnovers instead of just “forced” turnovers. We acknowledge that 
some turnovers may be voluntary. For example, the CEO may reach the retirement age and voluntarily 
step down. To control for the retirement effect, following Goyal and Park (2002), we include a 
dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is between 62 and 66 years old, and 0 otherwise. We also 
divide the CEO tenure into three segments: less than 3 years, 3 to 5 years, more than 5 years but less 
than 13 years. Bebchuk et al. (2011), who show that when CEO tenure is less than 3 years, the CEO is 
significantly more likely to be dismissed. Jenter and Lewellen (2010) find that “[i]n the first five years 
of tenure, CEOs who perform in the bottom quintile are 42 percentage points more likely to depart 
than CEOs in the top quintile.” Brookman and Thistle (2009) show that the “risk of termination 
increases for about thirteen years before decreasing slightly with CEO tenure.” Therefore, we include 
three dummy variables corresponding to three segments of CEO tenure, and interact them with the 
firm’s stock return.  
Insert Table 8 here 
Table 8 shows that, for firms with positive R&D expenditure, the presence of IED on the board 
significantly increases the probability that a CEO will be dismissed following poor industry-median 
adjusted stock return. These results support Hypothesis 5. The dummy variable “CEO age between 62 
and 66” is significantly and positively correlated with CEO turnover, which shows that this variable 
captures voluntary turnovers to some extent. It is interesting to note that CEO-board chairman duality 
significantly reduces the likelihood of CEO turnover, which is consistent with the results reported in 
Goyal and Park (2002). 
23 
 
 
3.8. The impact of IEDs on firm innovation 
Insert Table 9 here 
To test Hypothesis 6, we merge our data with U.S. patent data from the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) Patents File (Hall, et al., 2001). NBER documents patents and citations 
filed by firms in the US between 1976 and 2006. In view of the fact that the number of patents and 
citations are censored at 0, we estimate Tobit models. Table 9 shows that firms with at least one IED 
on the board successfully file for significantly more patents and those patents receive significantly 
more citations. These results support Hypothesis 6 and show that IEDs can better help firms innovate, 
which leads to higher firm value, as Table 4 shows. 
 
3.9. The market reactions to the appointments of IEDs  
In the Introduction section of the paper, we presented a case study of the strongly positive 
market reactions to the appointment of IEDs to the board of Bank of America. To see if such a pattern 
holds for a larger sample, we collect announcements of IEDs from BoardEx database. After tackling 
the contamination effect by checking the announcements with other major corporate announcements 
such as earnings and mergers and acquisitions, we are left with 334 announcements of directors, 
including 66 announcements of IED appointments, 208 announcements of INED appointments, and 
60 announcements of inside director appointments. 
Insert Table 10 here 
In panel A of Table 10, we report event study results. The mean and median cumulative 
abnormal returns over the event window [-2, +2] are significantly positive for IED appointments, but 
insignificantly different from 0 for INED or inside director appointments. In panel B, we report 
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multivariate regression results, which show that even after controlling for other firm characteristics, 
IED appointments still have significantly higher average abnormal returns than INED or inside 
director appointments.  
 
3.10. CEO power, IED presence and firm value 
To test Hypothesis 7, we use Principal Component Analysis to derive indexes of CEO power. 
To construct CEO power index 1, we aggregate the CEO-chair duality, CEO ownership of the firm, 
the natural logarithm of CEO tenure, the CEO entrenchment index (Bebchuk et al, 2009), the ratio of 
the CEO compensation over the compensation of the second-highest paid executive. We find that the 
coefficients for CEO duality, CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and E-index have expected signs (positive 
for the first three, and negative for the last one), but the coefficient on the relative compensation ratio 
has a negative sign, which suggests that we may drop relative compensation for robustness check. We 
then drop relative compensation and compute CEO power index 2. Similar to Morse et al. (2011), we 
use a dummy variable to indicate firms with the same person serving as the CEO, board chairman and 
company president. As Morse et al. (2011) argue, when the CEO and the board chairman is the same 
person, the CEO can direct board initiatives. When the CEO-chairman also serves as the company 
president, the board will not be able to have an in-training successor whom they may resort to if they 
disagree with CEOs.  
We aggregate the CEO-chair-president dummy with CEO ownership, E-index, and ln(CEO 
tenure) to get CEO power index 2. In our Principal Component Analysis for this index, all coefficients 
on the variables have expected signs. Data on CEO ownership, CEO-Chairman duality, and CEO-
Chairman-President dummy are from RiskMetrics, executive compensation and CEO tenure data are 
from CompuStat, and CEO entrenchment index is from Lucian Bebchuk’s website. 
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Insert Figure 2 and Table 11 here 
Figure 2 reports that both CEO power indexes indicate a sharp decline in CEO power between 
2003 and 2006/2007, and a rise of CEO power towards the end of our sample period. The sharp 
decline in CEO power coincided with the rise in IED ratio on the board. Table 11 reports the 
Heckman 2-step results. Models 1 and 3 show that CEO power is negatively and significantly 
correlated with the presence of IEDs on the board, which lends support to Hypothesis 7.  These results 
are consistent with casual observation. For example, Pollock (2009) reports that a very successful 
retired CEO of a Fortune 100 company said, “[y]es, from the point of view of the CEO, the ideal 
board is 100 percent independent directors except for the CEO. That’s the board I’d like to have! I’d 
be the only one who actually knows anything, and I’d be able to do whatever I want.” 
 
3.11. Relationship between IEDs and institutional ownership 
Together with IEDs, we have considered the impact of institutional ownership. Similar to 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009), we find that for firms with lower institutional ownership 
concentration (i.e., the total ownership of the top 5 institutional investors is in the bottom quartile), the 
fraction of IEDs on the board has positive and significant impact on firm performance, but for firms 
with higher institutional ownership concentration (i.e., the total ownership of the top 5 institutional 
investors is in the top quartile), the fraction of IEDs on the board has no significant impact. These 
results suggest that IEDs and institutional ownership appear to be substitutes in corporate governance. 
 
4. Conclusion  
Conventional wisdom holds that a higher proportion of independent directors on a corporate 
board will contribute to better corporate policies and firm performance. The rationale is that, 
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compared with insider directors, independent directors will have fewer conflicts of interest with 
corporate executives. As a result, they may better align their interests with shareholders’ interests, and 
more effectively monitor and advise CEOs to maximize shareholder value. This “conventional 
wisdom” was the foundation of a series of legal and regulatory changes aiming at strengthening 
corporate governance practices in the US in the first decade of the 21st century. 
However, this “conventional wisdom” is not supported by empirical evidence. Researchers 
have not found a robust correlation between the proportion of independent directors on a board and 
major corporate decisions as well as firm performance. We argue that for an independent director to 
effectively perform her monitoring and advising roles, she not only needs to be independent, but also 
needs to have sufficient knowledge and information about the industry and the firm. We hypothesize 
that IEDs (independent expert directors), i.e., independent directors with industry experience, make 
significant contributions to firm performance by making better corporate decisions. On the other hand, 
INEDS (independent non-expert directors), i.e., independent directors without industry experience, 
despite being independent from the influence of CEOs, may not be able to make significant 
contributions.  
To test this hypothesis, we use newly available data on the full employment history of 
directors from the BoardEx database, which covers all directors of S&P 1,500 firms between 2000 and 
2008. We carefully merge this database with CompuStat, CRSP, GAO financial restatement database 
and US patent database. We find that the proportion of IEDs on a board is positively and significantly 
correlated with firm performance, but the proportion of INEDs on a board is not significantly 
correlated with firm performance. IEDs make significant and positive contributions to firm 
performance when the information costs are higher, but not when the information costs are lower. 
These results hold even after controlling for endogeneity and sample selection.  
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We further investigate how IEDs influence firm performance by affecting major corporate 
decisions. We find that a higher proportion of IEDs is associated with significantly less earnings 
restatements, especially for firms where the CEOs are less entrenched. A higher proportion of IEDs is 
positively correlated with cash holdings, especially for firms with positive R&D expenditure. When a 
board has at least one IED, CEO pay is significantly correlated with stock return, while when a board 
has no IED, CEO pay is insensitive to stock return. For firms with positive R&D expenditure, the 
presence of IED also significantly increases the probability that a CEO will be dismissed following 
poor performance, as measured by the firm’s stock return. Such effects vanish for firms with zero 
R&D expenditure. We find that when a firm’s board has IED, the firm successfully files more patents, 
and the patents also receive more citations. To estimate the market reactions to the appointments of 
IEDs, INEDs, and inside directors, we conduct an event study. Our event study results show that 
market reactions to IED appointments are positive and significant, but market reactions to INED and 
inside director appointments are insignificantly different from zero.  
In summary, our results show that IEDs boost firm performance by improving major corporate 
decisions such as earnings management, cash holdings, CEO pay, CEO turnover, and innovative 
projects. Our evidence suggests that IEDs have both the incentives and the industry-specific 
knowledge to more effectively monitor and advise CEOs than INEDs. What is the preference of CEOs 
regarding the appointments of IEDs versus INEDs? We show that more powerful CEOs tend to avoid 
IEDs. This is likely due to the fact that even though CEOs may like the improved firm performance 
due to better advising of IEDs, they do not like the increase in the monitoring intensity associated with 
the appointments of IEDs. Our evidence shows that on average, the latter effect seems to dominate the 
former effect.  
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We feel that current research on board directors seems to focus more on their incentives than 
on their ability and information. As a result, the independence of directors seems to have received 
much more attention than the qualifications of directors. We hope that our research can highlight the 
importance of director qualifications, such as their past work experience.  
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Table 1 
Markets Reaction to Bank of America’s Replacement of Two Outside  
Directors without Banking Industry Experience with Four Outside Directors  
with Banking Industry Experience on June 5, 2009 
 
This table reports the CARs for Bank of America’s announcement of replacement of two outside directors 
without banking industry experience with four outside directors with banking industry experience. The 
market model is estimated using the value-weighted CRSP index as a proxy for the market returns over 
days [-210,-10]. The abnormal return is computed for each day in the event window by subtracting the 
expected return from the market model from the actual return.  
 
Event window 
Cumulative Abnormal Return 
(CAR) 
(0,+1) 2.16% 
(-1,+1) 6.67% 
(-2,+2) 6.18% 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics  
 
The sample is a panel of S&P 1,500 companies between 2000-2008. Independent directors are 
classified as IED if they have worked in the same industry as the firm where they serve as directors.  
 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Observations 
IED/Board size 0.23 0.08 0.2 0.36 7856 
INED/Board size 0.45 0.3 0.46 0.62 7836 
Assets (million USD) 7416.74 559.38 1453.8 4263.03 7856 
Leverage 0.2 0.03 0.19 0.31 7856 
R&D Expenditure/Sales 0.06 0 0 0.05 7856 
Capital Expenditure/Sales 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.07 7856 
Firm Age 23.49 9 17 34 7856 
Number of business segments 2.43 1 1 4 7856 
Board size 7.83 6 8 9 7856 
CEO-Chairman Duality 0.6 0 1 1 7856 
Industry competition (Herfindal Index) 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.08 7856 
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Table 3. Determinants of IED 
 
The sample is a panel of S&P 1,500 companies during 2000-2008. Independent directors are classified as 
IED if they have worked in the same industry as the firm where they serve as directors. Robust standard 
errors are estimated. P-values are reported in the brackets. ***, ** and * refer to significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Presence of IED (Probit Model) IED (%) (Tobit Model) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Full  Positive Zero Full  Positive Zero 
Sample R&D R&D Sample R&D R&D 
Number of Neighboring  0.008*** 0.025*** 0.001 0.001** 0.002* 0.001 
    Firms in the Same Industry  [0.002] [0.000] [0.765] [0.036] [0.071] [0.315] 
R&D/Sales 0.842*** 0.739*** 0.066*** 0.056*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.003] 
Ln(Assets) -0.011 0.029 -0.081*** -0.002 0.003 -0.010 
[0.520] [0.230] [0.002] [0.660] [0.678] [0.213] 
Leverage -0.095 -0.273 -0.044 -0.039 -0.014 -0.040 
[0.407] [0.113] [0.797] [0.264] [0.762] [0.450] 
Capital  Expenditure/Sales 0.411 1.215 -0.025 -0.115 -0.169 -0.090 
[0.310] [0.154] [0.959] [0.273] [0.354] [0.493] 
Ln(Age) 0.011 -0.018 0.014 -0.020*** -0.017 -0.020* 
[0.643] [0.610] [0.667] [0.009] [0.117] [0.053] 
Number of  -0.007 -0.008 0.001  -0.008** 
-
0.013*** 0.002  
 Business Segments [0.544] [0.643] [0.962] [0.014] [0.001] [0.755] 
Ln(Board Size) 0.771*** 1.041*** 0.642*** 0.022 -0.006 0.047 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.323] [0.845] [0.126] 
CEO-Chair Duality -0.096*** -0.017 -0.155*** -0.023** -0.033** -0.012 
[0.010] [0.766] [0.00279] [0.024] [0.019] [0.413] 
Industry Competition 1.214 -0.805 1.609 0.109 -0.308 0.221 
[0.158] [0.692] [0.106] [0.478] [0.297] [0.219] 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7856 4210 3646 7856 4210 3646 
Pseudo R-squared 0.207 0.227 0.188 0.685 0.948 0.566 
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Table 4A. Industry Experience of Independent Directors and Firm Performance 
 
The sample is a panel of S&P 1,500 companies during 2000-2008. Independent directors are classified 
as IED if they have worked in the same industry as the firm where they serve as directors. This table 
reports the second stage results from the Heckman 2-step procedure. Robust standard errors clustered at 
firm level are estimated. P-values are reported in the brackets. ***, ** and * refer to significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted Ln(Market/Book) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Full  Positive Zero Full Positive Zero 
Sample R&D R&D Sample R&D R&D 
IED/Board size 0.133*** 0.147*** 0.077 0.161*** 0.183*** 0.014 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.171] [0.003] [0.005] [0.847] 
INED/Board size 0.038 0.048 -0.090 
[0.434] [0.432] [0.132] 
Ln(Assets) 0.012* 0.034*** -0.041*** 0.012* 0.034*** -0.041*** 
[0.077] [0.000] [0.000] [0.078] [0.000] [0.000] 
Leverage -0.427*** -0.422*** -0.409*** -0.429*** -0.424*** -0.402*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
R&D Expenditure 
/Sales 0.040* 0.035*  0.040* 0.036*    
[0.095] [0.065] [0.089] [0.0603] 
Capital  
Expenditure/Sales 0.959*** 1.925*** 0.605*** 0.967*** 1.939*** 0.590***   
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0] [0.000] 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.037*** -0.053*** -0.021* -0.038*** -0.053*** -0.019* 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.051] [0.000] [1.41e-06] [0.079] 
Number of  -0.032*** -0.041*** -0.024*** -0.032*** -0.041*** -0.024*** 
 Business Segments [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0] [0.000] 
Ln(Board Size) -0.164*** -0.125*** -0.034 -0.167*** -0.130*** -0.029 
[0.000] [0.007] [0.516] [0.000] [0.00519] [0.583] 
CEO-Chair Duality 0.037** 0.012 0.047** 0.035** 0.009 0.052*** 
[0.017] [0.481] [0.014] [0.024] [0.591] [0.008] 
Industry Competition -0.738* -0.687 -0.235 -0.736* -0.690 -0.248 
[0.085] [0.339] [0.547] [0.085] [0.337] [0.528] 
Lambda -0.591*** -0.312*** -0.213 -0.589*** -0.310*** -0.228 
[0.000] [0.002] [0.128] [0.000] [0.00166] [0.104] 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7856 4210 3646 7856 4210 3646 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 4B. Industry Experience of Independent Directors, Information Costs and Firm Performance  
The sample is a panel of S&P 1,500 companies during 2000-2008. Independent directors are classified as 
IED if they have worked in the same industry as the firm where they serve as directors. This table reports the 
second stage results from the Heckman 2-step procedure. Robust standard errors clustered at firm level are 
estimated. P-values are reported in the brackets. ***, ** and * refer to significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
  Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted Ln(Market/Book) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
More  Less  More  Fewer  More  Fewer  
Dispersion Dispersion Dispersion Analysts Analysts Analysts 
IED/Board Size 0.112** 0.114 0.187*** 0.173*** 0.004 0.110 
[0.016] [0.172] [0.005] [0.001] [0.948] [0.103] 
INED/Board Size 0.094 -0.087
[0.115] [0.136] 
Ln(Assets) 0.009 -0.006 0.009 -0.093*** -0.010 -0.092*** 
[0.220] [0.662] [0.231] [0.000] [0.391] [0.000] 
Leverage -0.221*** -0.548*** -0.225*** -0.238*** 
-
0.518*** -0.237*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
R&D 
Expenditure/Sales 0.085*** 0.219 0.086*** 0.030 0.297** 0.029 
[0.000] [0.347] [0.000] [0.202] [0.029] [0.218] 
Capital 
Expenditure/Sales 0.270 1.799*** 0.288* 0.732*** 0.606** 0.708*** 
[0.103] [0.000] [0.0818] [0.001] [0.023] [0.002] 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.037*** 0.038* -0.038*** -0.049*** 0.023 -0.048*** 
[0.001] [0.061] [0.001] [0.000] [0.202] [0.000] 
Number of  -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** 
-
0.025*** -0.028*** 
   Business Segments [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ln(Board Size) -0.087* -0.151** -0.095** -0.156*** -0.138** -0.145*** 
[0.068] [0.028] [0.046] [0.004] [0.016] [0.008] 
CEO-Chair Duality 0.027 0.057* 0.022 0.098*** -0.017 0.101*** 
[0.101] [0.051] [0.191] [0.000] [0.491] [0.000] 
Industry Competition -0.249 -0.799 -0.248 0.020 -1.611** 0.006 
[0.599] [0.355] [0.600] [0.968] [0.034] [0.991] 
Lambda -0.217** -0.763*** -0.215* -0.399*** 
-
0.626*** -0.399*** 
[0.048] [0.000] [0.051] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3565 3679 3565 3655 3589 3655 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 5. IED and Earnings Restatement 
 
The sample is a panel of S&P 1,500 companies during 2002-2005. Independent directors are classified as 
IED if they have worked in the same industry as the firm where they serve as directors. This table reports the 
Logit model estimation results. Robust standard errors clustered at firm level are estimated. P-values are 
reported in the brackets. ***, ** and * refer to significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: Dummy=1 if Earnings Restatement Occurred (Logit Model) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Full  
Less 
Entrenched 
More 
Entrenched Full 
Less 
Entrenched 
More 
Entrenched  
Sample CEO CEO Sample CEO CEO 
IED/Board size -1.817** -2.239** -0.848 -2.535*** -2.726*** -2.204 
[0.020] [0.019] [0.446] [0.004] [0.008] [0.223] 
INED/Board size -1.307 -0.895 -2.051 
[0.119] [0.328] [0.382] 
ROA -3.506** -3.626** -6.027* -3.464** -3.649** -5.744 
[0.010] [0.022] [0.075] [0.010] [0.019] [0.115] 
Ln(Assets) 0.013 0.144 -0.642*** 0.020 0.155 -0.624*** 
[0.917] [0.327] [0.004] [0.874] [0.298] [0.005] 
Leverage 0.750 0.656 -0.603 0.784 0.683 -0.762 
[0.234] [0.382] [0.504] [0.196] [0.346] [0.392] 
R&D 
Expenditure/Sales -0.144 -0.069 -4.520 -0.169 -0.089 -4.192  
[0.672] [0.808] [0.253] [0.640] [0.763] [0.262] 
CEO-Chair 
Duality 0.045 0.249 -0.483 0.122 0.295 -0.351  
[0.864] [0.432] [0.468] [0.637] [0.337] [0.629] 
Ln(Firm Age) 0.054 0.120 -0.129 0.070 0.128 -0.104 
[0.771] [0.579] [0.728] [0.709] [0.557] [0.769] 
Ln(Board Size) 0.095 -0.274 1.640 0.191 -0.235 1.778 
[0.867] [0.662] [0.191] [0.740] [0.714] [0.161] 
Market-to-Book -0.367* -0.404** -0.280 -0.356* -0.397** -0.313 
[0.058] [0.046] [0.666] [0.058] [0.044] [0.637] 
Number of  0.084 -0.011 0.325** 0.100 0.000 0.363** 
    Business 
Segments [0.269] [0.899] [0.032] [0.168] [1.000] [0.021]  
Industry 
Competition -28.043 -14.003 -103.447*** -25.029 -12.962 -94.108***  
[0.213] [0.547] [0.003] [0.252] [0.551] [0.006] 
Industry fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 3360 2177 705 3357 2174 705 
Pseudo R-squared 0.104 0.125 0.215 0.108 0.128 0.220 
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Table 6. Cash Holdings 
 
The sample is a panel of S&P 1,500 companies during 2000-2008. This table reports the OLS 
model estimation results. Robust standard errors clustered at firm level are estimated. P-values are 
reported in the brackets. ***, ** and * refer to significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
  Dependent variable: Ln(Cash Holding/Sales+1) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Full  Positive Zero Full Positive Zero 
Sample R&D R&D Sample R&D R&D 
IED/Board size 0.198*** 0.280*** -0.003 0.172*** 0.233*** -0.022 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.938] [0.000] [0.000] [0.633] 
INED/Board size -0.035 -0.061 -0.029 
[0.214] [0.205] [0.210] 
Ln(Assets) -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 
[0.238] [0.492] [0.784] [0.251] [0.546] [0.789] 
Leverage -0.144*** -0.142** -0.138*** -0.142*** -0.139** -0.136*** 
[0.001] [0.024] [0.000] [0.001] [0.025] [0.000] 
R&D 
Expenditure/Sales 0.457*** 0.426***  0.457*** 0.425***   
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Capital 
Expenditure/Sales -0.621*** -1.269*** -0.257** -0.626*** -1.283*** -0.258**  
[0.000] [0.000] [0.012] [0.000] [0.000] [0.012] 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.013** -0.021** 0.002 -0.013* -0.021** 0.004 
[0.046] [0.040] [0.740] [0.055] [0.038] [0.630] 
Number of  -0.015*** -0.019*** -0.005 -0.015*** -0.019*** -0.005 
 Business Segments [0.000] [0.000] [0.206] [0.000] [0.000] [0.196] 
Ln(Board Size) -0.024 -0.052** 0.010 -0.020 -0.047* 0.013 
[0.137] [0.045] [0.482] [0.232] [0.085] [0.382] 
CEO-Chair Duality -0.003 -0.016 0.009 -0.001 -0.013 0.010 
[0.731] [0.230] [0.200] [0.905] [0.342] [0.158] 
Industry Competition -0.037 0.275 -0.030 -0.038 0.292 -0.033 
[0.570] [0.143] [0.558] [0.556] [0.125] [0.524] 
E-index -0.018*** -0.023*** -0.009** -0.018*** -0.022*** -0.009** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.032] [0.000] [0.001] [0.038] 
Observations 6421 3565 2856 6408 3559 2849 
Adjusted R-squared 0.509 0.549 0.262 0.509 0.549 0.263 
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Table 7. Industry Experience of Independent Directors  
and CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
 
The sample is a panel of S&P 1,500 companies between 2000 and 2008. This table reports the OLS model 
estimation results. Robust standard errors clustered at firm level are estimated. P-values are reported in the 
brackets. ***, ** and * refer to significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
  
 ln(Total Compensation)  
Industry-adjusted  
ln(Total Compensation)  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
With IED  Without IED With IED Without IED 
Stock return(t-1) 0.129*** 0.067 0.101*** 0.025 
 [0.000] [0.277] 
[0.000] [0.592] 
ln(sales) 0.462*** 0.505*** 0.453*** 0.477*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
[0.000] [0.000] 
CEO age 0.014 0.061** 0.004 0.058** 
 [0.604] [0.032] 
[0.867] [0.035] 
CEO age squared -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.001** 
 [0.551] [0.040] 
[0.798] [0.043] 
CEO tenure -0.007* -0.009 -0.007* -0.008 
 [0.063] [0.111] 
[0.053] [0.134] 
R&D 
Expenditure/Sales 0.676*** 3.109*  
0.658*** 2.503 
  
 [0.000] [0.066] 
[0.000] [0.134] 
Capital 
Expenditure/Sales -0.158 0.981  
-0.471 0.590 
  
 [0.742] [0.103] 
[0.329] [0.284] 
CEO Duality 0.194*** 0.052 0.181*** 0.038 
 [0.000] [0.496] 
[0.000] [0.610] 
Ln(Geographic 
Segments) 0.037 -0.003  
0.043 0.016 
  
 [0.218] [0.951] 
[0.157] [0.775] 
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ln(firm age) -0.034 -0.017 -0.033 -0.020 
 [0.230] [0.768] 
[0.237] [0.732] 
Industry competition 0.003 -0.895 0.311 -0.769 
 [0.996] [0.303] 
[0.580] [0.449] 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4616 1316 4616 1316 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.508 0.502 0.508 0.502 
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Table 8. CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity  
 
The sample is a panel of S&P 1,500 companies during 2000-2008. This table reports the 
Logit model estimation results. Robust standard errors clustered at firm level are 
estimated. P-values are reported in the brackets. ***, ** and * refer to significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
   
  Dependent variable: CEO Turnover   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Positive R&D Zero R&D 
Positive 
R&D Zero R&D   
IED presence dummy*industry-adjusted 
stock return (t-1) -0.829** -0.045 -0.850** 0.144   
[0.017] [0.911] [0.032] [0.800] 
CEO age between 62 and 66 1.759*** 1.366*** 
[0.000] [0.000] 
CEO tenure between 1 and 2 
years*industry-adjusted stock return(t-1)   -1.324** 0.326   
[0.027] [0.685] 
CEO tenure between 3 and 5 
years*industry-adjusted stock return(t-1)   -0.021 0.177   
[0.963] [0.791] 
CEO tenure between 6 and 12 years* 
industry-adjusted stock return(t-1)  0.210 0.328   
[0.645] [0.611] 
CEO tenure between 1 and 2 years -1.147*** -1.429*** 
[0.000] [0.000] 
CEO tenure between 3 and 5 years -0.675*** -0.792*** 
[0.000] [0.000] 
CEO tenure between 6 and 12 years 0.301* -0.220 
[0.084] [0.254] 
IED Presence dummy 0.193 0.085 0.357* 0.291 
[0.219] [0.545] [0.096] [0.132] 
Industry-adjusted stock return(t-1) 0.123 -0.360 0.197 -1.061* 
[0.680] [0.283] [0.616] [0.053] 
ln(Assets) 0.127*** 0.102* 0.157*** 0.117* 
[0.000] [0.054] [0.001] [0.099] 
Leverage 0.237 -0.051 0.291 0.101 
[0.512] [0.893] [0.524] [0.847] 
R&D/Sales -1.509** . -1.995* . 
[0.036] . [0.061] . 
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Number of business segments 0.016 0.040 0.031 0.056 
[0.584] [0.317] [0.409] [0.259] 
CEO-Chairman Duality -1.530*** -1.175*** -1.902*** -1.712*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Industry competition -2.251 -0.367 -4.480 -0.559 
[0.591] [0.893] [0.306] [0.853] 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3808 3229 3599 3022 
Pseudo R-squared 0.096 0.066 0.176 0.128 
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Table 9. IED and Firm Innovation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) 
ln(Patents+1) ln(Citations+1)
IED Presence Dummy 0.343*** 0.380** 
[0.010] [0.035] 
Market/Book 0.207*** 0.240*** 
[0.000] [0.000] 
ln(Asset) 0.791*** 0.945*** 
[0.000] [0.000] 
Firm Age 0.013*** 0.014*** 
[0.001] [0.003] 
Leverage -0.521 -1.052* 
[0.206] [0.089] 
Ln(Business Segments) 0.088 0.013 
[0.320] [0.909] 
Ln(Geographic Segments) 0.080 0.130 
[0.373] [0.260] 
CEO-Chair Duality 0.081 0.102 
[0.457] [0.486] 
Year dummy Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes 
Observations 7856 7856 
Adjusted R-squared 0.323 0.364 
   
   
 
 
The sample is a panel of S&P 1,500 companies during 2000-2006. This table reports the Tobit model 
estimation results. Robust standard errors clustered at firm level are estimated. P-values are reported 
in the brackets. ***, ** and * refer to significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10. Shareholder Wealth Effects of Director Appointments 
 
This table reports event study results for announcements of director appointments. The market 
model is used. The estimation window is [-255,-40], and the return on the Value-Weighted 
CRSP proxies Market Return. For Panel B, robust standard errors are estimated. P-valued are 
reported in the brackets. ***, **,* refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
   
Panel A. CAR[-2,+2] 
  N Mean Median %>0 
IED 66 0.59%** 0.93%** 58%* 
(0.045) (0.034) (0.096) 
INED 208 0.08% 0.30% 52% 
(0.896) (0.79) (0.282) 
Insider 60 0.17% -0.17% 47% 
    (0.576) (0.697) (0.322) 
Panel B. Multivariate Regression 
  CAR[-2,+2] 
IED Dummy 0.009* 
(0.070) 
INED Dummy 0.002 
(0.692) 
ln(Asset) 0.001 
(0.448) 
Leverage 0.002 
(0.862) 
R&D 
Expenditure/Sales -0.014        
(0.595) 
Capital 
Expenditure/Sales 0.011        
(0.776) 
ln(Firm Age) 0.002 
(0.290) 
Industry competition 0.016 
  (0.537) 
Observations 320 
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                  Table 11. CEO Power, IED and Firm Value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 
Presence of  
Industry-
adjusted Presence of  
Industry-
adjusted 
IED ln(M/B) IED ln(M/B) 
CEO Power Index1 -0.085*** 
[0.000] 
CEO Power Index2 -0.086*** 
[0.000] 
Number of neighboring 0.014*** 0.014*** 
Firms in the Same Industry [0.000] [0.000] 
IED/Board size 0.196*** 0.197*** 
[0.010] [0.009] 
INED/Board size 0.083 0.084 
[0.208] [0.198] 
CEO-Chair Duality -0.016 -0.023 
[0.452] [0.271] 
Ln(Assets) -0.008 0.041*** -0.009 0.041*** 
[0.735] [0.000] [0.719] [0.000] 
Leverage -0.241 -0.458*** -0.250 -0.458*** 
[0.166] [0.000] [0.152] [0.000] 
R&D Expenditure/Sales 5.175*** 0.045 5.180*** 0.045 
[0.000] [0.315] [0.000] [0.312] 
Capital  Expenditure/Sales 0.465 0.967*** 0.455 0.970*** 
[0.457] [0.000] [0.467] [0.000] 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.015 -0.010 -0.016 -0.010 
[0.685] [0.503] [0.670] [0.509] 
Number of  -0.025 -0.025*** -0.025 -0.026*** 
  Business Segments [0.111] [0.000] [0.110] [0.000] 
Ln(Board Size) 0.817*** -0.205*** 0.813*** -0.204*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Industry Competition 1.970* -0.527 1.939* -0.515 
[0.093] [0.367] [0.098] [0.375] 
Lambda -0.586*** -0.582*** 
[0.000] [0.000] 
The sample is a panel of S&P 1,500 companies during 2000-2008. Heckman 2-step estimation 
procedures are used. Robust standard errors clustered at firm level are estimated. P-values are 
reported in the brackets. ***, ** and * refer to significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
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Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4691 4691 4691 4691 
Pseudo R-
squared/Prob>Chi2 0.236 0.000 0.236 0.000 
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Figure 1. Time Series Trends of IEDs vs. INEDs 
         The sample is a panel of S&P 1,500 companies between 2000-2008. This figure illustrates the 
time series trends of the proportion of IEDs (i.e., IDIEs: independent directors with industry 
experience), INEDs (i.e., IDNIEs: independent directors with no industry experience) and 
independent directors on the board.  
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Figure 2. Time Series Trends of CEO Power and IED Ratio 
          The sample is a panel of S&P 1,500 companies between 2000-2008. This figure illustrates the 
time series trends of average CEO power and the proportion of IEDs (i.e., IDIEs: independent 
directors with industry experience) on the board. 
 
 
